Mozilla Firefox :


Opera Web-Browser :

Mozilla Firefox Advisory Description

Security researcher David Bloom of Cue discovered that <select> elements are always-on-top chromeless windows and that navigation away from a page with an active <select> menu does not remove this window.When another menu is opened programmatically on a new page, the original <select> menu can be retained and arbitrary HTML content within it rendered, allowing an attacker to cover arbitrary portions of the new page through absolute positioning/scrolling, leading to spoofing attacks. Security researcher Jordi Chancel found a variation that would allow for click-jacking attacks was well.

In general these flaws cannot be exploited through email in the Thunderbird and SeaMonkey products because scripting is disabled, but are potentially a risk in browser or browser-like contexts in those products.

Opera Advisory Description : 

Dialogs such as the download dialog are usually displayed on top of page content, to ensure that the user knows that the dialog is requesting attention. In some cases, this policy was not implemented correctly in Opera, allowing certain page content to overlay the dialog. In these cases, clicking the page content causes the dialog to be clicked instead. While an attacker may not have much control over the appearance of the overlapping content, they may be able to use it to trick the user into performing harmful actions, such as running a downloaded executable.

Voici encore un nouveau ClickJacking critique qui a cette foi l'avantage d'être exploitable sur les toutes dernières version de Mozilla Firefox !
En effet mes dernières recherches avait pour but de détecter une nouvelle méthode pour mener a bien une attaque de clickjacking avec les Applet Java , Addon XPI (etc) sur les versions les plus récentes de Firefox.

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When a user is interacting with a window, that window should be visible to the user, to ensure that the user realizes it is there. If a page is displayed in a small enough window, the user may not realize it is being displayed, and if the right keyboard sequence is carefully followed, they can end up performing undesirable actions on that page. Similar attacks could also be used against Opera's preferences to change preferences or select executables to be run by Opera. Additional social engineering steps are needed to ensure that the user presses the correct key sequence, without being able to show any relevant visual feedback, as the page cannot see that the keys are being pressed.

When a user double clicks on a page, they may expect the two clicks to target the same object. If a page uses the first click to open a pop-up window in a predictable location, the second click may focus parts of the new window, such as its address field. If the page can then convince the user to activate a scripted URL seeded in the address field, on a newly loaded target page within the pop-up, it can allow cross site scripting against the target page. Similar attacks could also be used against Opera's preferences to change preferences or select executables to be run by Opera. Non-trivial social engineering would be required to ensure that the user followed the desired sequence of clicks and keypresses, at precisely the right speed, while ignoring the opening and loading of pages within the pop-up.

When the download dialog is displayed, it should always be visible to the user, to ensure that the user realizes it is there. If the dialog is displayed in a small enough window, the user may not realize it is being displayed, and if the right keyboard sequence is carefully followed, they can end up running a downloaded executable. Additional social engineering steps are needed to ensure that the user presses the correct key sequence, without being able to show any relevant visual feedback, as the page cannot see that the keys are being pressed

The address field should always show the address of the page that is being displayed. In certain cases, if a target site responds slowly, reloading an attacking page and redirecting to the target page can cause the address field to show the target site's address, while the attacking site is still being displayed.